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
**EMBRACING THE OCTOPUS:
THE INTEGRATION OF EUROPEAN MARITIME FORCES
IN ANY FUTURE ARRANGEMENT FOR A COMMON EUROPEAN DEFENCE**

A paper by

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Submitted with a view to satisfaction of the requirements of the Advanced Research Program, and in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the College of Naval Warfare.

The opinions contained in this paper those of the author. It is not intended to represent the views of the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence nor of the United States Department of Defense.



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EMBRACING THE OCTOPUS: THE INTEGRATION OF EUROPEAN MARITIME FORCES IN ANY FUTURE ARRANGEMENT FOR A COMMON EUROPEAN DEFENCE

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INTRODUCTION

At the launch of the French nuclear aircraft carrier in May 1994 President Mitterand hailed the ship as the centrepiece of a European Fleet. Whether seen as an outburst of French hubris or a pragmatic conceptual proposal, this announcement coincided with an initiative to build a multinational European maritime force. France, Italy, Spain and subsequently Portugal had been working towards the establishment of such a force to be known as EUROMARFOR to operate periodically in the Mediterranean¹. The concept was made public at the meeting of the Western European Union (WEU) Council in Lisbon in May 1995.

There are clearly good operational reasons for EUROMARFOR and its ground equivalent, the EUROFOR. The participating nations share concerns about instability in North Africa and the consequences for their own security. An operation in the Maghreb, for instance an evacuation of nationals, would not necessarily involve the United States. Nor might some north European allies for whom the risks to security were less immediate be eager to be embroiled. For these reasons NATO may decline to conduct such an operation². The concerned European nations would then need to form a coalition of the willing making use of any existing multinational force that contained the appropriate mix of nations.

¹EUROMARFOR will not be the first purely European maritime formation. The United Kingdom/Netherlands Amphibious Force has been in existence for many years; but this force was constituted within the NATO force planning system to operate as part of NATO's integrated force structure. EUROMARFOR is not a NATO force (nor indeed a WEU force) although an agreement will presumably be negotiated for it to be used in NATO roles along similar lines to the memorandum of understanding between the German and French governments on the one hand and SACEUR on the other for the use of the Euro-Corps by NATO.

²There is also the matter of NATO's competence. The Alliance tentatively embraced peace support in the Oslo Declaration and has conducted coercive operations in the former Yugoslavia, extending its competence de facto outside the Article VI area ("The NATO Area") but this is hardly a wholesale extension of competence to cover the full range of military tasks worldwide. Some members still have constitutional and legal constraints.

However, one cannot ignore the possibility of a more overtly political motive. These are but the latest of a succession of nascent European forces that began with the Franco-German Brigade, later to grow into the Euro-Corps, and include the Franco-British Euro Air Group³. It is significant that France is the only common participant in all of these forces⁴ and it is France, who remains outside the Integrated Military Structure⁵ (IMS) of NATO, who has been a principal advocate of a European force structure.

In 1996 the European Union (EU) Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC) will consider progress in developing a common foreign and security policy (CFSP). The signatories of the 1991 Maastricht Treaty agreed that a common defence policy (CDP) would be framed within CFSP and that this might in time lead to a common defence⁶. Come the Conference it would take no more than a christening for these barely formed European formations to be presented as the EU's infant army, fleet, and air force, with the prospect of much fleshing out and fattening up at the expense of NATO. An Atlanticist cynic might say that common defence was amongst us already as some Gallic Rosemary's Baby.

Whatever the motive for the conception of these forces, it will take much more than baptism for them to become militarily useful. There is a need to establish common training, procedures and logistics, exercising opportunities and headquarters arrangements to name but a few of the aspects of the problem. Similarly at the political level the integration of national forces into that something that might be called common defence has a number of elements that bear analysis.

³Launched at the Franco-British Summit at Chartres, November 1994.

⁴There are some purely European forces within NATO's force structure in which France does not participate, for instance the United Kingdom/Netherlands Amphibious Force [UK/NLAF] and the Multinational Division (Central) [MND(C)] of the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps [ARRC].

⁵NATO's IMS comprises the NATO Military Command Structure (Including the Defence Planning Committee, Military Committee, Major NATO Commanders and Subordinate Commands), the associated command boundaries, the International Military Staffs at NATO Headquarters and those of subordinate commands, the Defence Planning System, the NATO Force Structure and NATO Infrastructure Programme.

⁶Article J.4 Treaty on European Union, Maastricht, December 1991.

PURPOSE AND SCOPE

The task ahead is to analyze the meaning of the expression "common defence" in its European context and to trace its implications for maritime forces. A great deal of military integration already takes place within NATO and to a lesser extent within WEU organs. A necessary step will be to examine the nature and degree of integration as it is at present because there is experience to be gleaned. Furthermore there are existing edifices which must either be built upon or destroyed and replaced.

Some governments have become associated with extreme views in the debate over European security and defence integration. There is no intention here to take a particular position in this debate nor prescribe how Europe's security should best be managed at the grand strategic level⁷. The purpose is rather to examine the military issues that should be addressed if the integration of European military forces is to be enhanced in any practical, as opposed to purely symbolic, way.

The very adjective "European" poses problems in establishing the bounds of discussion. Not all members of the EU are members of the WEU. Furthermore, the membership of both institutions is likely to increase as is that of NATO. This paper tackles military integration as it might affect the existing members of the WEU⁸, and those European nations within the EU with WEU Observer status. Those NATO nations which are Associates of the WEU (Norway and Turkey) could not participate fully in a European common defence as they are not members of the EU. However, they have achieved a level of integration with WEU members as members of NATO's IMS and participate in WEU business. They may be partners in future European operations and their potential contribution of maritime forces is therefore considered.

⁷For discussions of the security and defence policy issues surrounding the IGC and national positions see the Centre for Defence Studies (King's College, London) paper, *A Common Foreign and Security Policy for Europe the Inter-Governmental Conference of 1996*, London: Centre for Defence Studies, 1995, and Laurence Martin and John Roper eds., *Towards a Common Defence Policy*, Paris: Institute for Security Studies WEU, 1995.

⁸Present membership of the WEU is Belgium, France, Germany, Greece (membership awaiting ratification), Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom all of whom are members of the European Union. Of the other European members of NATO, Norway and Turkey have Associate Membership of the WEU and Denmark has elected for Observer status. The EU members outside NATO, the Republic of Ireland, Sweden, Finland and Austria have WEU Observer status.

The implications of the expansion of European security organizations and of the integration of non-WEU forces into WEU operations are acknowledged in the course of the paper as they are relevant. An assumption is made that the WEU will outlive the 1996 IGC as a distinct organization from the EU, but this assumption is not essential to the argument or conclusions below.

Although maritime integration is the subject at hand, many of the issues that are raised apply equally to the Land-Air environment and insights would be relevant to the wider problem of joint integration. In this respect this maritime study might be seen as exemplary. There are of course areas in which both land and air forces are already breaking new ground in co-operation⁹.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MARITIME DIMENSION

The subject of specifically maritime military integration is of particular and urgent interest for two principal reasons. First, maritime forces have already been used operationally under a WEU aegis on several occasions namely, during the Iran-Iraq War, subsequently in the Gulf during the Iraq-Kuwait War and recently in the Adriatic and on the Danube. The operational use of European maritime forces is already a fact, albeit driven by events rather than the unfolding of a fully developed concept for integration. Open source conceptual work examining all aspects of integration is arguably overdue.

It is no coincidence that the first operational uses of WEU forces have been in the maritime environment. Maritime forces can easily be employed in ad hoc coalition operations if extensive combat at high levels of intensity is not expected. This facility is greatly enhanced if the contributing nations are members of NATO or are otherwise familiar with NATO's tactical publications and procedures, as is the case for any WEU operation. Preparatory planning need be modest. Indeed the minimum requirement to assemble a maritime force for,

⁹These include the affiliations between European formations in the NATO Central Region, and the institution of the EuroCorps, EUROFORCE, the Franco-British Euro Air Group mentioned earlier - and, of course the Franco-British Reaction Force transported to Bosnia to reinforce NATO's coercive and protective measures.

say, a surveillance operation is a geographic assembly area and a common radio frequency. The ease with which concerted¹⁰ maritime operations can be set up has given multinational maritime forces considerable political utility early in a crisis when there may be a need to demonstrate multinational solidarity but when a common set of objectives is still being refined.

The second reason for examining integration specifically in the maritime environment is probably the more pressing. The procurement cycle for warships is lengthy and entails considerable initial investment for a return that may be spread over twenty years, or more for the largest war vessels. The decision to replace warships and sustain warship numbers is a costly and difficult one for individual medium and minor maritime powers to make. Furthermore, there are areas of capability, which, once surrendered, may call into question the viability of a nation's whole independent maritime force structure. As a result, as nations reduce the size of their maritime forces, there are step changes in capability that are likely to occur, for instance, if a shipborne fixed wing aviation, amphibious or submarine capability is surrendered. This is not to say that a smaller maritime power may not recognize the importance of these capabilities for its own security; rather that they would not unilaterally be able to field them cost-effectively in significant strength. Furthermore the loss of a core capability calls into question the purpose and cost-effectiveness of the supporting capabilities, such as mine countermeasures or fixed wing maritime surveillance, that a smaller nation might be still able to afford. If maritime capability requirements can be defined for Europe as a whole, nations can identify sensible individual contributions of core and supporting capabilities within a European system.

The cost advantages of force planning and procurement on a multinational scale are obvious, and within NATO a degree of European role specialization has already taken place¹¹. However NATO's maritime forces have at their core the substantial United States Navy which is, to a large extent, self-contained and not dependent on its allies for the provision

¹⁰This expression has been used in WEU documentation to describe maritime operational co-operation at its most informal.

¹¹Few European nations claim to be able to marshal a full range of capabilities. Several smaller navies principally contribute forces for coastal defence and mine countermeasures and would rely on larger partners to provide the capability for power projection and blue water sea control.

of particular capabilities¹². European maritime forces need to be able to operate across the full range of envisaged tasks in the absence of their North American allies. Whether NATO's force planning system will in the future be considered an appropriate vehicle for providing an adequate rationale in the form of operational requirements that will create and sustain these forces will be discussed in a later section.

THE CONCEPTUAL LEGACY OF MAASTRICHT

The Maastricht Treaty sees CDP and any common defence arrangements as lying within the Second Pillar of the Union, the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The semantic distinctions between security and defence are important in this context as it is in the matter of NATO's primacy in European **defence** over which there is potential for disagreement between nations¹³. The debate can be crudely characterized as between a European Federalist lobby and an Atlanticist lobby.

In its extreme form a Federalist agenda would include the complete integration of European defence arrangements within the EU at the expense of NATO's IMS. NATO would effectively be reduced to a purely political defensive alliance between the EU, the USA and Canada - and any other nations outside the EU who might subsequently join NATO. The WEU would be incorporated into the EU as a fourth Pillar (with some resolution of the problem of the four neutral members of the EU¹⁴).

Conversely the Atlanticists have sought to prevent the establishment of any formal European military structures that would replicate NATO's arrangements and might lead to a weakening of the engagement of the United States in the security of Europe.

A prerequisite for any defence co-operation between nations is commonality of a core of

¹²The USN has in the past been dependent on a contribution of European mine countermeasures capability for certain contingencies. Of course the only operations for which the US could rely on the availability of this contribution would be defensive operations against attack of NATO territory under Article V of the Washington Treaty. It remains to be seen to what extent this dependency will continue.

¹³For a discussion of national positions vis á vis the IGC and also of relevant security and defence issues see the Centre for Defence Studies, King's College London op. cit.

¹⁴The Republic of Ireland, Sweden, Finland and Austria. All the remaining EU members except Denmark are members of the WEU.

security and defence objectives. Only in a situation in which member nations of an alliance or federation have identical security and defence objectives and the certainty that these will remain identical for the foreseeable future can the member nations surrender their individual defensive arrangements totally to some common effort. In reality there are and will inevitably be some national objectives that are not shared. Several member nations of the EU have national defence responsibilities outside the general European area¹⁵.

Common Security Policy

A European definition of security policy can be distilled from Article J.1 of the Maastricht Treaty which discusses foreign and security policies under a single heading. The objectives of European security policy are to safeguard common values, fundamental interests and the independence of the Union, strengthen the security of the Union and its member states in all ways, preserve peace and, finally, strengthen international security. The instruments of security policy are generally accepted as diplomatic, economic and military¹⁶. As an inter-governmental Pillar of the EU the CFSP is intended to include inter-governmental mechanisms for the development of European security policy as the security situation demands. The Treaty is not specific as to whether a capstone Security Policy document¹⁷ is ultimately envisaged although this would be the logical outcome of the coming of age of CFSP. Indeed it would be essential if the EU were to proceed to develop a common defence.

Common Defence Policy

In a national context defence policy is usually taken to mean policy governing the provision and use of the military instrument of security policy. In the context of collective European defence the provision¹⁸ of armed forces has to date been a national responsibility although

¹⁵The United Kingdom's Dependent Territories, French Overseas Departments and Territories, the Netherlands Antilles and Spanish Enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in North Africa.

¹⁶In the national context these are the three sources of national power that are more or less under government control. Some would include technology, information and the robustness of internal polity as sources of power and weakness.

¹⁷Whether expressed as a strategy along the lines of NATO's Strategic Concept of October 1991 or the US Administration's periodic National Security Strategy, or a simple statement of security objectives without any attempt to specify "ways and means".

¹⁸meaning force planning, procurement and sustainment.

the members of NATO's IMS take part in integrated force planning and there are arrangements for collaborative procurement. Under a minimal interpretation a European CDP might be restricted only to policy facilitating the integration or co-ordination of the use of armed forces. However, a more developed CDP could also have a role in the provision of armed forces and would no doubt assume aspects of this role if a common defence were also instituted.

At the very least a CDP would need to tackle two tasks. It should provide some enduring defence objectives, and based on these it should issue standing guidance for the development of procedures and contingency planning for the ad hoc integration of European forces. It could "commission" the WEU or even NATO to carry out this second task by mutual agreement between the institutions. However, the EU's defence objectives would necessarily be its own as long as there is no coincidence of membership between the EU and these organizations. These objectives in turn should be derived from enduring security policy objectives. It follows that in developing a CDP CFSP must necessarily produce a formal EU security policy document.

Policy for the integration of the use of armed forces raises some awkward questions. The various nations of the Union have differing constitutional, legal, customary and resource constraints on how, where and for what military forces may be used. Britain and France, for instance, are relatively unconstrained in their ability to use their armed forces for tasks that go beyond the requirements of territorial defence compared with, say, Denmark or Germany. There are also differences between nations in the acceptable use of armed forces for constabulary (policing) tasks.

In the very long term variations between European nations in the legal status of their forces for such operations as support to the enforcement of civil law and intervention beyond the requirements of strict territorial defence may conceivably be eliminated. However, in the short and medium term at least some nations may continue to impose national restrictions on the use of their forces for multinational tasks, and some will continue to procure and operate forces to meet national requirements as well as the corpus of shared objectives. These factors place considerable constraints on the ideals of integration and

advantages of scale.

It will be apparent from a later section that there is already an array of staffs, committees and groups who are charged with overseeing most of the elements of a common European defence. Most report to the WEU Council. What they lack however is the comprehensive conceptual framework that NATO enjoys that links policy at the inter-government level with decisions that actually affect the provision, preparation and employment of the constituent forces. It has been said earlier that a minimum requirement of a CDP would be a set of **standing defence objectives**. In defining these a CDP should acknowledge the role of NATO in particular in territorial defence, identify any particular European responsibilities for this and address the issue of nuclear deterrence.

Common Defence

To effect a common defence these defence objectives should then be translated either as part of CDP or through the WEU into **military strategic guidance**. This guidance would include a statement of European missions presumably expanding on and developing the missions announced in the Petersberg Declaration¹⁹ of peace support, crisis management and humanitarian operations. Among other things it should spell out the use of European forces for common constabulary tasks and in support of diplomacy both of which are problem areas, which will be discussed in a later section. From this strategic guidance a list of European military tasks could be derived. These could form the basis for the planning and implementation of a common defence.

The expression "common defence" does not in itself define a particular degree of integration of the defence efforts of individual nations. In one limited sense those present members of the EU who are not avowedly neutral as a matter of national policy already share a common defence in their membership of NATO. A treaty agreement that attack on one member of an alliance shall be considered an attack against all members such as that enshrined in Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty has in the past been accepted as a definition of a common

¹⁹June 1992.

defence²⁰ and does not necessarily imply participation in integrated defence structures, as France's status in NATO since 1966 demonstrates. At the other extreme a common defence might entail completely integrated standing defence forces involving a high degree of multinationality, manning commonly procured equipment, and operating under a permanent multinational command structure which itself acknowledges the sovereignty of some federal political authority.

Suffice it to say that "common defence" is taken in this paper to mean that some or all members of the EU might agree to mechanisms that will define some common defence objectives; that these objectives will include the use of armed forces in pursuit of wider security objectives than strict territorial defence; and that this congruence of objectives at the grand strategic level will be carried through into some military institutional changes.

Before examining the requirements for a future common European defence one must somehow vault the hurdle of institutional uncertainty. At present the WEU is described by its members as the future defence arm of the European Union²¹. It could discharge this function either on a case by case basis at the request of the EU or by incorporation into the EU as a fourth inter-Governmental pillar²². If it remained an independent agent of the EU (reflecting the differences in membership), it could presumably decline to act on occasion or, alternatively, act on its own initiative. It might also need to request NATO for the use of resources and facilities that it did not possess²³. For the purposes of this paper, however, whether the WEU is independent of the EU or incorporated, it will require to discharge the same functions although the political processes that initiate action may be different.

²⁰John Roper distinguishes "collective self-defence" as provided for by the Washington Treaty from "common defence". See *Defining a common defence policy and common defence* in Martin and Roper eds. op. cit.

²¹Declaration by WEU Ministers at Maastricht 1991.

²²This proposal has been made by the Dutch government in preparation for the IGC but is likely to be opposed by the United Kingdom for one.

²³This provision was agreed in principle at the NATO Summit in January 1994.

COMMON DEFENCE MISSIONS AND ILLUSTRATIVE MARITIME TASKS²⁴

The specific European missions for military forces were identified by WEU Ministers in the Petersberg Declaration as crisis management, peace support, and humanitarian operations. Although the Brussels Treaty allows for the collective territorial defence of member states, this remains a core NATO mission that the WEU would not wish to duplicate²⁵.

While the Petersberg missions may all appear on first glance to be small beer with little risk of high intensity combat, this is actually not the case. As involvement in civil war in the former Yugoslavia has shown, peace operations can be prolonged and involve a large commitment of force. The expression "crisis management" spans the spectrum of conflict from precautionary operations in peacetime to large deployments and employment of force on the scale of Operation DESERT SHIELD²⁶, albeit short of full hostilities.

Setting aside the issue of territorial defence for the moment, one can draw up an illustrative list of European maritime tasks derived from the Petersberg missions and any future common constabulary roles that may be sanctioned by the EU. In the exercise below and the accompanying Figures (1 to 4) individual tasks have been identified by letter and number for ease of cross-reference subsequently.

Crisis Management Tasks (Figure 1)

This Petersberg mission comprises measures to modify a crisis, that is a situation that may threaten European objectives or interests, which interrupts the normal processes of peacetime relations between nations or the process of government within a nation. A crisis may create an expectation of hostilities and hence a sense of urgency. Crisis management includes measures to modify the causes of a potential crisis and prevent its onset (crisis prevention),

²⁴Tasks, expressions and definitions used in this section draw on British maritime doctrine to be published in *The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine*, London: HMSO, 1995.

²⁵It is the policy of all member states consider that the participation of the US remains essential to a robust defence of Europe against major attack.

²⁶Deterrent and coercive operations during the 1991-2 Iraq-Kuwait War conducted by coalition forces led by the US and directed against Iraq.

and to contain and reduce it (crisis control). Military force is but one of the instruments of crisis management which must be carefully orchestrated if they are to be effective. Under the broad heading of **armed suasion**²⁷, military force will frequently be used to support diplomatic activity. Suasion depends for its effectiveness on the evidence of a robust capability for combat and the will to use it.

Maritime forces may also be used to enforce economic actions such as trade sanctions; and these in turn may support diplomacy as evidence of international displeasure with an errant state²⁸. Surveillance and evacuation are specifically military tasks during crisis management. However, they will not be conducted independently of the other instruments. Surveillance activity in itself may be a means of sending diplomatic signals; and the safe evacuation of non-combatant personnel will invariably be accompanied by intense diplomatic activity.

Ground, air and naval forces each contribute to the support of diplomacy through armed suasion in specific ways²⁹. At the lowest level of involvement there is the decision not to be involved in a particular international disturbance. Military forces have a role even at this level as non-involvement can send a range of signals. At the next level there is diplomatic and military involvement but with an easy path to disengagement. Here naval and air forces are particularly useful in offering an array of actions ranging from presence, through surveillance, to sanctions enforcement operations, exclusion operations and coercive actions involving combat at a distance. The highest level of suasive action consists of involvement of joint and combined forces on the territory or a friend or ally to be protected or indeed ground claimed by an aggressor. Here disengagement is the most difficult and commitment

²⁷Edward N Luttwak, *The Political Uses of Seapower*, Baltimore MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974.

²⁸Sanctions in the form of arms embargoes can also have a military purpose in restricting the capacity to fight.

²⁹In most cases substantial acts of armed suasion will be joint operations. The insertion of Army combat units into the territory of a friend or ally requires a considerable degree of political commitment to deterrent or compellent action on the parts of both the providing and receiving state. By the same token they signal the strongest political resolve as they indicate in the most vivid way a nation or coalition's will to risk losses in support of its commitment. Political and military objectives must be very clear before insertion. There is a strong risk of embroilment because urgent withdrawal is difficult particularly for heavy forces. Also, the extraction of ground units under duress may signal retreat and loss of face. Aircraft can be powerful coercive systems in that they can concentrate firepower rapidly on suitable target sets from considerable range. They cannot sustain a presence although the deployment of land-based aircraft into theatre shows a strong measure of commitment given the compliance of some regional nations for forward basing, host nation support and overflying rights.

The material in this paragraph and footnote is drawn from a paper prepared for the United Kingdom Naval Staff in 1993 entitled *Conventional Deterrence in the Changed Strategic Environment* and subsequently modified to reflect the comments of the other Services and Central Staffs and released for open source publication. It is not a statement of Ministry of Defence Policy.

is greatest. Ground forces are the essential element for this level of involvement.

Naval Suasion (Naval Diplomacy) (CM1) The uses of naval³⁰ force as a diplomatic instrument have been much discussed and subjected to academic analysis³¹. Naval forces can create and exploit access from the sea. Their particular utility is their capacity to poise in theatre from the earliest stages of tension either overtly or covertly and with minimal diplomatic preparation. Specific tasks can be categorized as:

- *Presence (CM1.1)* Naval forces may be deployed to a theatre to conduct port visits, exercising, surveillance and routine operations. In so doing they give evidence of interest to friendly governments, possible adversaries and others. Presence can contribute to general stability and deterrence. It may even support commercial initiatives. Presence is an important element of NATO's concept of maritime operations and the EU/WEU might consider extending its scope to specifically European areas of interest.

- *Symbolic uses (CM1.2)* Naval forces can be used to signal a message to a **specific** government or non-governmental actor while not in themselves posing any threat to an opponent or providing significant military assistance to a friend.

- *Preventive, precautionary and pre-emptive deployments (CM1.3)* There may be a need to influence events particularly at an early stage in a potential crisis. Specific European policy objectives may be unclear or unresolved beyond the need to declare interest or commitment and avoid maldeployment. Under these circumstances naval forces may poise in theatre for subsequent use when objectives have been refined. These tasks differ from routine presence in that they accompany diplomatic activity in relation to a specific potential or actual crisis and to identified actors.

³⁰"Naval" is used advisedly in this context rather than "maritime". It is the armed force that is deployed in and from naval vessels that is at issue.

³¹See Luttwak op cit, Sir James Cable. *Gunboat Diplomacy 1919 - 1991 (Third Edition)* Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994; and Ken Booth, *Navies and Foreign Policy*, London: Croom Helm, 1977.

- ***Supportive uses (CM1.4)*** Naval forces may be deployed to provide a friendly government with concrete evidence of military support through reinforcement. they might perhaps form the basis for the construction of an ad hoc coalition between WEU/EU and other forces.

- ***Coercive uses (CM1.5)*** Limited offensive action may be threatened or used to give evidence of will and of greater force to follow either to **deter** a possible transgressor or to **compel** one to comply with a diplomatic demarche or resolution.

- ***Deployment of nuclear deterrent forces (CM1.6)*** It is conceivable that the European nuclear powers could put their seaborne nuclear weapons at the disposal of the EU³².

Surveillance (CM2) The collection of information is a prerequisite for effective crisis management. Maritime forces can be useful particularly early in a potential crisis when freedom of movement in international waters can be exploited. Surveillance will often be carried out concomitantly with other tasks such as presence. The **monitoring of adherence to embargo or economic sanctions** is a form of surveillance.

Evacuation (CM3) Operations to evacuate European and other nationals from a crisis area are a likely military contingency for European forces. Although these would usually be joint operations, an independent naval operation across a beachhead may be necessary where airfields and commercial ports are not available. Where the host nation is able to provide for the security of the evacuation, military forces may be required to act in an enabling and assisting capacity. However forces may be required to protect evacuees and in extreme cases an evacuation could be a full combat operation.

Embargo and Economic Sanctions Enforcement (CM4) Sanctions and embargo are important crisis management tools. These constabulary tasks are usually carried out under international mandate and have already been practised by European forces in the Gulf and

³²French hints and overtures to this effect have been detected in particular in the wake of the French nuclear test under Mururoa atoll on September 1995. The French Prime Minister, Juppé, made a speech shortly afterwards offering French nuclear deterrence specifically to the Franco-German partnership. The response of European partners at the time was reported in the press as dusty.

Adriatic.

Combat Tasks (CM5) Effective naval suasion depends on a perception of both will and capability by target governments. The necessary capabilities that underpin coercive and supportive suasion are those required to engage in successful combat operations if deterrence fails or compulsion is unsuccessful. Maritime combat operations have traditionally been categorized as **power projection** operations from the sea and **sea control** operations at sea.

- *Operations from the sea.* These include **amphibious operations (CM5.1)** (assaults, raids, feints, demonstrations and withdrawal), and **naval fire support to land operations (CM5.2)** in the form of organic naval aircraft, land attack missiles and naval gunfire support. Maritime forces can also **protect the maritime flank of a land operation (CM5.3)** against attack from the sea.

- *Operations at sea.* These include **coastal defence (CM5.4)**, the **interdiction of threatening maritime forces and shipping (CM5.5)**, strategic or operational **blockade (CM5.6)**, other methods of **containment of threatening forces³³ (CM5.7)**, and **protection of own and friendly maritime forces and shipping (CM5.8)** - for example by convoying and screening. The **establishment and maintenance of military or total exclusion zones (CM5.9)** is a device in resolving the sea control problem and may also be a useful option for coercion.

Protection of Shipping (CM5.8). There will be a need to protect merchant shipping in situations short of hostilities and there are deterrent means of achieving this where the threat is modest, for instance close and distant escort, that may not constitute full combat operations. Were the EU to establish the mooted European "flag" for the registration of shipping, there would be significant implications for the protection of shipping. Warships currently have rights under international law to extend self defence to the protection of national shipping and may have some national obligations to provide protection. They may also have some jurisdiction over that shipping to enforce national law. By the same token

³³In particular by posing a threat to an opponent's own critical interests for which he must retain his maritime forces in defence.

national merchant shipping may have some rights to claim protection. In the context of a European registration of shipping similar precepts would need to be defined and established. This issue is discussed further under "Constabulary Tasks" below.

MARITIME CRISIS MANAGEMENT TASKS

Surveillance (CM2)

Evacuation (CM3)

Embargo and Economic Sanctions Enforcement (CM4)

Naval Suasion:

Presence (CM1.1)

Symbolic uses (CM1.2)

Preventive, precautionary & preemptive deployments (CM1.3)

Supportive uses (CM1.4)

Coercive uses (CM1.5)

[Nuclear deterrence (CM1.6)]

Combat Operations:

Amphibious operations (CM5.1)

Naval fire support to land operations (CM5.2)

Protection of the maritime flank of land operations (CM5.3)

Coastal defence (CM5.4)

Interdiction of threatening forces and shipping (CM5.5)

Blockade (CM5.6)

Containment by other means (CM5.7)

Protection of maritime forces and shipping (CM5.8)

Establishment and maintenance of exclusion zones (CM5.9)

Figure 1: Illustrative Crisis Management Tasks

Peace Support Tasks (Figure 2)

Maritime forces may contribute organic aircraft to the enforcement of a no fly zone and combat air support (PS1), and helicopters in particular to in theatre movement of peacekeeping forces and humanitarian aid, and casualty evacuation (PS2). Amphibious forces may contribute to ground peacekeeping operations (PS3), and an amphibious capability in theatre may permit the withdrawal of peacekeeping forces, aid workers and other civilians (PS4). Maritime forces may provide seaborne medical and other logistic and

humanitarian resources (PS5)³⁴ where access by land is difficult. Naval forces may patrol and monitor a maritime cease fire line or demilitarized zone (PS6) and supervise the cantonment of vessels (PS7). They may provide a neutral platform for peace negotiations (PS8) and mine countermeasures forces and other ordnance disposal³⁵ (PS9) to permit access or contribute to the process of peace building.

MARITIME PEACE SUPPORT TASKS

- Organic aircraft for enforcement of no fly zone and combat air support (PS1)
 - Organic aircraft for movement of forces, aid and casualty evacuation (PS2)
 - Amphibious contribution to ground peacekeeping operations (PS3)
 - Maintenance of precautionary amphibious capability in theatre (PS4)
 - Provision of seaborne medical and other logistic resources (PS5)
 - Patrolling and monitoring of a maritime cease-fire line (PS6)
 - Supervision of the cantonment of vessels (PS7)
 - Neutral platform for peace negotiations (PS8)
 - Mine countermeasures operations to provide access and as peace building (PS9)
-

Figure 2: Illustrative Peace Support Tasks

Humanitarian Tasks (Figure 3)

These tasks include disaster relief (H1) in the wake of both natural events such as hurricanes, earthquakes and famine, or man-made ones such as civil war. Maritime forces may also contribute medical, transport and other logistic resources to humanitarian aid ashore (H2) in other situations. They may assist seaborne and stranded refugees. Other humanitarian tasks are search and rescue (H3), salvage (H4), pollution control (H5) and ordnance disposal (H6).

³⁴The same task as H2 below.

³⁵Included within H7 below.

MARITIME HUMANITARIAN TASKS

Disaster relief (H1)
Contribution of logistic resources to humanitarian aid ashore (H2)
Assistance to seaborne and stranded refugees (H3)
Search and rescue (H4)
Salvage (H5)
Pollution control (H6)
Ordnance disposal (H7/PS9)

Figure 3: Illustrative Humanitarian Tasks

Other Constabulary (or Policing) Tasks (Figure 4)

These tasks include **anti-piracy operations (C1)**, **fisheries protection (C2)**, **drug interdiction (C3)**, **contraband operations (C4)**, **control of illegal immigration (C5)**, **oil and gas field patrols (C6)**, **maritime counter-terrorism (C8)** and **enforcement of maritime agreements (C9)** such as traffic separation schemes.

Constabulary operations are undertaken by military units within very tight legal constraints which militate against their adoption as common European tasks. Except for a few offenses such as piracy, constabulary operations of the sort listed above generally enforce national law within the territorial seas, contiguous zones and exclusive economic zones of individual nations. Whatever national civil authority they are afforded, warships do not usually have the jurisdiction to take constabulary action on the high seas or in other nations' waters even where, as in the case of fisheries protection, there is European law to be enforced. Furthermore the military forces of some nations are not permitted by national law to undertake constabulary tasks in support of the civil power or civil ministries.

These legal constraints could be removed in the longer term if there was a common will to do so amongst EU members but there has not been significant progress in this respect. Indeed fisheries protection is characterized as much by confrontation between nationals within the Union as by protection of European resources against the predations of non-Europeans.

Warships of any nation have jurisdiction to suppress piracy on the high seas although it is common for pirates to evade interception by retiring into territorial seas. Because of the commercial implications of piracy the EU may have a role in negotiating co-operative anti-piracy measures with littoral states in areas of high risk. This role would be enhanced if the EU were to establish the European shipping register discussed earlier. Under these circumstances the WEU would be an agent for suppression of piracy and protection of European flag shipping.

In the particular field of counter-narcotics the Vienna Convention does allow for some extension of jurisdiction but this is not a specifically European convention.

MARITIME CONSTABULARY TASKS

- Anti-piracy operations (C1)
 - Fisheries protection (C2)
 - Drug interdiction (C3)
 - Contraband operations (C4)
 - Control of illegal immigration (C5)
 - Oil and gas field patrols (C6)
 - Maritime counter-terrorism (C7)
 - Enforcement of maritime agreements (C8)
-

Figure 4: Illustrative Constabulary (Policing) Tasks

Territorial Defence

While the membership of the WEU remains included within that of NATO, there is no need for the WEU to adopt territorial defence as a mission. However, if the WEU were to accept new members who were not also members of NATO, these new members would be protected by the guarantee under Article 5 of the modified Brussels Treaty rather than that under Article V of the Washington Treaty in which case territorial defence at least of the new member states would become a WEU mission.

The neutral members of the EU are of course covered by neither guarantee. There is a logical contradiction which cannot be gainsaid in any of these nations taking part in either a European CDP or a common defence unless they renounce their neutral status or adopt some other constitutional or legal enabling device. In this event there may be no bar to their joining the WEU and NATO. If they were not able to do so, however, the EU would need to provide the equivalent security guarantees as an element of its CDP and adopt territorial defence as a mission in its own right³⁶. A similar situation would arise if any further new members of the EU were not willing or able to join the WEU or NATO. It may of course be possible, although untidy, for one or more of the presently neutral nations or new members to remain outside a CDP and a common defence and this may be a solution chosen by the EU, at least in the short term.

The maritime implications of a new WEU or EU/CDP mission of territorial defence are fairly specific. Finland or Sweden might take part in a common European defence but remain outside NATO. If either were subject to invasion that did not directly threaten any NATO members and did not warrant a (Washington Treaty) Article V response, the eastern Baltic and Barents Sea would become theatres of specifically European maritime operations. It is hard to imagine an invasion of Ireland that did not directly threaten the territory of a NATO member. Austria is landlocked. Of new members, one might postulate that the most likely significant candidates for membership of the EU are the Visegrad Four (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary). It is likely that these states would also join NATO if invited as all are already beating at NATO's door. If this were not the case, however, only Poland has a maritime perimeter and, once again, this is the eastern Baltic³⁷.

Of course any operations to protect the territorial integrity of a state in the eastern Baltic

³⁶To conceive of a CDP or common defence arrangement that did not at the very least make provision for territorial defence of its participants would be absurd unless this defence were provided for by another institution.

³⁷Turkey is a candidate for EU membership but is also a member of NATO, as is Norway if there was to be a change in national attitude to membership. Of the second tier candidates for EU membership, the Baltic Republics, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, all abut an eastern Baltic maritime theatre of operations. The membership of Romania and Bulgaria would bring with it a European military interest in the Black Sea which would perhaps be beyond the purview of NATO. If Malta was admitted to the EU and to a common defence but remained outside NATO and was subject to invasion, its defence might be a purely European responsibility. However, the scale of the operation would probably lie within that of contingency plans for crisis management elsewhere in the Mediterranean. The admission of Cyprus into the EU and a common defence would bring particular problems although membership would presumably be conditional on resolution of the issue of partition and improvement in relations between Greece and Turkey.

would be likely to be supported by maritime operations elsewhere, for instance for the protection of reinforcement and resupply routes and the interdiction of enemy reinforcements.

In the event that the EU/WEU were to adopt any mission for territorial defence, it is clear that the relevant maritime tasks are already covered as combat operations under "Crisis Management". The scale of capabilities that may be required for territorial defence may of course be considerably larger than those required for crisis management in a European context. In particular, coastal defence could demand huge resources. However, the tasks are the same.

DERIVATION OF A COMMON EUROPEAN DEFENCE FROM EXISTING ARRANGEMENTS

There are eight broad functional elements of maritime integration within a regime for European common defence (Figure 5). These elements are: force planning; equipment procurement; inter-operability between forces; operational planning and execution; command structures; force structures; training and exercising; and logistics. The next section examines existing mechanisms within the broad context of Europe for achieving degrees of integration in these categories in the maritime dimension. A future common European defence may not include all of these categories and each admits of degrees of integration³⁸. This section of the paper assumes that the development of a common European defence would be an evolutionary process because a plan to create new arrangements from scratch ignoring and duplicating what has already been achieved in NATO and the WEU would fail on grounds of cost to gain the approval of member governments. Even if the IMS of NATO were Europeanized as some might wish, this would represent an evolution rather than a revolution because the constituent parts would presumably remain the same in essence.

It would also seem to be an axiom that the development of a common European defence

³⁸There are of course many degrees of integration. In a notional extreme form, integrated forces might consist of centrally recruited and trained personnel operating commonly procured equipment in fully multinational formations governed by a command structure with a federal political institution at its apex. In preparation for the IGC no member nation of the EU has advanced this model as a realistic manifestation of common defence even in the long term. Co-operation (concertation) and co-ordination express lesser degrees of congruence than full integration. This issue is addressed later in the paper with reference specifically to the integration of operations.




Figure 5: Elements of European Maritime Integration

should not make the conduct of operations under NATO command more difficult. It would be folly for Europe to tinker with arrangements to the extent that it would be more difficult than at present for European forces to integrate with those of the US whose capabilities will remain essential to the defence of Europe in the face of major attack. Moreover these capabilities will be welcome and in many cases necessary to successful operations. Inter-operability between NATO members should be improved rather than weakened by any European activity. From a EU/WEU viewpoint developments in inter-operability should seek to extend the achievements of NATO to non-NATO Europeans.

Existing mechanisms and agencies for maritime integration are examined in the next section under the eight elements listed earlier. In each case ideas for the evolution of these mechanisms are then discussed.

MECHANISMS FOR INTEGRATION IN THE MARITIME DIMENSION

Force Planning and Harmonization

To be effective agents of a permanent coalition's policy its forces should be structured and equipped to serve the range of missions and detailed tasks envisaged in its policy statements. On the realistic assumption that these forces will be provided by individual nations rather than commonly procured³⁹, there must be some process for defining coalition requirements and allocating national contributions. Since the formation of NATO's IMS, the WEU has not maintained a separate force planning system. However, the WEU is now developing its competence to conduct purely European operations. If it is to be successful there must be mechanisms to ensure that European forces will have the right balance of capabilities to accomplish European missions and tasks along the lines of those forty illustrative tasks listed in an earlier section.

While it is possible for a coalition to plan balanced forces⁴⁰ by role specialization between

³⁹At least in the short and medium term.

⁴⁰Balanced forces are those that can be generated and sustained with the necessary capabilities to carry out envisaged missions without unnecessary redundancy.

the member nations, this concept limits the individual nations' ability to field a balanced fleet for national purposes. NATO has avoided the adoption of wholesale role specialization for this reason and also because it might provide the excuse for some nations to shed roles and thereby reduce their financial commitment to the Alliance. There is inevitably some role specialization in NATO as smaller nations are unable to afford or justify to their electorates the maintenance of a full range of capabilities. But the WEU would be ill-advised to import the concept wholesale because, without US forces, it can less afford wanton role-shedding than NATO.

There are three existing mechanisms for collective force planning in the context of European defence:

- ***NATO's Defence Planning System.*** For nations that are members of NATO's IMS and for Spain NATO's force planning process determines the forces required by the Alliance. It co-ordinates national defence plans, draws these towards agreed force goals, and establishes NATO's five year Force Plan. The process is conducted within the strategic framework and guidance provided by NATO's Strategic Concept⁴¹, periodic guidance from NATO's defence ministers and subordinate military documents. France does not take part.

- ***Western European Union (WEU) Planning Cell (PC).*** Among other tasks the WEU PC is charged with drawing up lists of forces which could be made available by nations to the WEU⁴² for operations identified in the Petersberg Declaration. The WEU PC has an input into NATO's force planning process.

- ***EUROLONGTERM (European Long Term Concepts).*** This forum which was a sub-group of the defunct EUROGROUP now reports to the WEU Council. Its structure includes a Sea Sub-Group which meets periodically with WEU PC representation. EUROLONGTERM has not to date had a high profile but it would be the appropriate

⁴¹NATO's Strategic Concept

⁴²Known as "forces answerable to the WEU (FAWEU)".

agent for deriving future European maritime tasks from strategic guidance and the development of long term European maritime force requirements. This conceptual work would require substantiation by independent study and, perhaps, operational analysis for which funding would be required. Economies could be achieved, however, in extending similar NATO or national studies to include WEU questions and objectives.

Force planning is one of the key functions of NATO's IMS. Duplication of this function in full by some European agency would certainly be perceived as weakening to NATO and prejudicial to the engagement of the US in the security and defence of Europe. However, NATO's force planning process is not able to recognize France's substantial military contribution formally. Nor is it tasked with identifying those capabilities that must be provided by European forces in the absence of North American participation in a European operation.

Presumably it is the purpose of the WEU PC input into NATO's force planning to provide this data. However, the WEU is not staffed to provide the detail of work currently undertaken by the staffs of the Major NATO Commanders and NATO's Integrated Military Staff in the preparation of Force Proposals, Force Goals and Long Term Requirements. There are (1995) some six naval officers in the WEU PC spread across four of the five functional sections.

Force Harmonization The putative function of the WEU PC in NATO force planning might be called one of *force harmonization*⁴³. Through this process it would provide proposals to harmonize those forces of WEU states who are outside NATO's IMS with those within to ensure that the coalition can muster sufficient forces on the day from the forces maintained by member nations without costly duplication. Input into NATO's force planning system could be through **Force Harmonization Proposals**. This difference in terminology from **NATO Force Proposals** would avoid the accusation of duplication. European force

⁴³The concept of force harmonization differs from that of role specialization in that harmonization acknowledges that a proportion of a nation's forces will be acquired and tailored to fulfil specifically national roles. Within these constraints harmonization seeks to create advantages of scale, enhance inter-operability, and eliminate wasteful redundancy, whilst ensuring equitable burden sharing.

harmonization would have four components:

- identification of the existing capabilities contributed by France and any other nations not within NATO's IMS;
- identification of the capabilities that would be required to achieve European military missions and tasks on the assumption that North American forces would not be able to participate;
- identification of shortfalls and apportioning these; and
- exposure of wasteful redundancy.

Assuming that the Director of the WEU PC would be the author of Force Harmonization Proposals, he would require some augmentation of his existing staff to prepare these Proposals perhaps through a structure of committees⁴⁴ representing the combat environments that would be convened for the task. Work on force harmonization would be carried out within the guidance provided by the EUROLONGTERM Sea Sub-Group in the form of future maritime tasks and long term European force requirements. Either the Director WEU PC or some specified WEU military authority, such as the chairman pro tempore of the WEU Chiefs of Defence, would require the equivalent authority of a Major NATO Commander (MNC) within NATO's Defence Planning System to lay Force Harmonization Proposals before the relevant NATO committees.

Existing European Maritime Forces The baseline for the force harmonization process would be the maritime force levels envisaged for the beginning of each NATO planning cycle. As an indication of the present situation existing European maritime force levels for selected categories of unit are listed in Figure 6 (1994 - 1995). These include units declared as "in store". The table indicates those European nations that are members of the WEU, the EU, NATO and specifically NATO's IMS. It therefore includes figures for Norway and Turkey.

⁴⁴Maritime and land/air or separate land and air environmental committees.

	BE	GE	GR	IT	NE	PO	UE	FR	SP	DA	SN	FI	TOTALS	NO	TU
WEU	-----												WEU EU		
EU	-----														
NATO	-----														
NATO IMS	-----														
<u>Surface ships</u>															
Carriers				1			3	2	1				7	7	
Cruisers				2				2					4	4	
Destroyers & frigates	3	12	14	26	18	11	35	39	16	3			176	176	4 21
Corvettes												2		2	
Missile craft		38	18	6						10	34	10	62	116	30 15
Patrol craft			19	6		30	33	23	31	27	7	9	132	175	27
Mine warfare craft	10	42	16	13	21		18	20	12	9	29	12	152	202	8 23
Amphib. ships			10	3			7	9	4				33	33	8
Amphib. craft		11	65	30	12	10	47	30	12		12	12	217	241	5 53
Underway replenish- ment ships		2		2	1	1	13	5	1				25	25	1
<u>Submarines</u>															
Nuclear ballistic missile							3	5					8	8	
Nuclear attack							12	6					18	18	
Diesel		20	8	9	6	3		7	8	5	12		61	78	12 15
<u>Fixed wing aircraft</u>															
Maritime patrol		18		18	15	6	30	30	7				124	124	2 21
Organic combat				5			35	115	18				173	173	
Shore based attack		64					12				1		76	77	
<u>Helicopters</u>															
Attack	3	17	12	84	22	Yes	137	23	25	8	10		328	346	6 17
Early warning							10		3				13	13	
Commando							29	17					46	46	
<u>Maritime Ground Forces</u>															
Amphibious forces (X 1000)				1.5	2.93	1.85	7.3	3.0	7.1				-23.68-		
	BE	GE	GR	IT	NE	PO	UE	FR	SP	DA	SN	FI		NO	TU

Source: *The Military Balance 1994 - 1995*, London: Brassey's (IISS), 1994.

Source: *The Military Balance 1994 - 1995*, London: Brassey's (IISS), 1994.

Figure 6: European Maritime Forces (Selected Categories)

Co-operation and Collaboration in Equipment Procurement

These processes are fostered within NATO by the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) and its subordinate groups which include the NATO Naval Armaments Group. France participates in CNAD which reports to the North Atlantic Council. Specifically European co-operation and collaboration are reflected in the work of the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG)⁴⁵ which operates under the auspices of the WEU.

As there is a large industrial dimension to equipment procurement and issues of trading practice such as competition, state subsidy and monopoly are involved, the first (Community) Pillar of the EU has and will continue to have an interest in procurement collaboration. Of the three Pillars the Community Pillar is of course the province of the European Commission⁴⁶ and procurement will be one of its avenues of influence in matters of security and defence.

For the future the WEAG provides a forum for European equipment collaboration. It is important, however, from a military point of view that the role of CNAD is recognized within any future European common defence structures. Equipment collaboration has consequences for standardization and inter-operability. If it is allowed to become exclusive and protective, inter-operability with North American forces may suffer.

Inter-operability

Standardization of equipment and procedures and combined training and exercising (addressed below) both contribute to inter-operability between the forces of the various nations. Inter-operability within NATO and with other nations who have adopted NATO standards has been a principal enabler in establishing ad hoc coalitions. Existing mechanisms for standardization are threefold:

⁴⁵Members are those of the former Independent European Programme Group (IEPG).

⁴⁶the Second (CFSP) and Third (Justice and Home Affairs) Pillars being inter-governmental.

- Operational and procedural standardization are handled within NATO by the NATO Group on Standardization which reports to the North Atlantic Council, and the Military Agency for Standardization (MAS) which in turn reports to the Military Committee. France and Spain take part in both activities. The MAS Naval Board directs working parties on a range of subjects⁴⁷. Of course standardization within NATO brings the same direct benefits to its European members.

- Equipment standardization is handled by CNAD and the WEAG which are discussed above.

- Specific matters of communications systems inter-operability within the WEU are handled by EUROCOM which is attended by representatives of WEU nations, Norway, Denmark and Turkey and representation from the Communications and Information Systems section of the WEU PC. It has Technical and Crypto Sub-Groups.

For the future it is most important for inter-operability that standardization of both procedures and equipment is taken forward on a NATO-wide and not an exclusively European basis. It is important to bear in mind continued inter-operability with other NATO allies, in particular the US. It would be militarily weakening if exclusive European mechanisms were developed, whatever the pressures of industrial competition might be. No particular European agencies should be developed and the roles of the NATO Group on Standardization and MAS should be recognized in any future European common defence structures. There will be a need to develop some specifically European procedures to cover eventualities not addressed in NATO procedures⁴⁸. This work would lie within the normal remit of the WEU PC.

⁴⁷Amphibious warfare, fuel and lubricants, helicopter operations, maritime tactics, mine warfare, ammunition interchangeability, radiation hazards, replenishment at sea, submarine escape and rescue, diving, and minewarfare exercise evaluation.

⁴⁸For example specific WEU procedures are required for the request and promulgation of Rules of Engagement as the WEU channels of command are different from those of NATO. However, there should be no need for a set of WEU standard Rules that differs from those of NATO.

Operational Planning and Execution

Degrees of maritime operational integration can be defined as a matter of doctrine⁴⁹. Multinational forces are **fully integrated** or **combined** when they operate under a single, unified command structure. The Rules of Engagement (ROE) under which they operate must be completely harmonized (preferably using a single system such as the NATO maritime system) and there must be formal arrangements for forming common political and military objectives. Where operations are **co-ordinated**, forces of more than one nation operate to achieve shared objectives but not under a formal unified command structure. There will normally be informal arrangements to co-ordinate tasks, to exchange information on national ROE, and to avoid mutual interference. Where forces from different friendly nations merely **co-operate** (**concerted** operations), they pursue similar interests but there is no definition of common policy objectives. There is usually agreement to provide some mutual assistance and to deconflict activities. ROE are unlikely to be shared.

There are two aspects to operational integration. The first is the co-ordination of the peacetime operating patterns of the various European maritime forces. The second is the integration of forces for specific operations in fulfilment of WEU/EU missions.

Ostensibly considerable rationalization in peacetime operating patterns between European maritime forces could be achieved particularly in constabulary or policing tasks in European waters. However, legal problems limit the widescale adoption of common constabulary tasks. These have already been discussed in the earlier section on maritime tasks.

There is already a great deal of co-operation and co-ordination between nations in benign tasks such as search and rescue. Search and Rescue Centres co-operate extensively and exchange information and maritime forces of any nation have an obligation under international law to render assistance on the high seas. Except for a few specialist units such as military search and rescue aircraft and hydrographic vessels, the forces for benign tasks will normally be drawn together in an ad hoc fashion from what is available to meet the

⁴⁹Chapter 7 of *The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine* shortly to be published by HMSO (1995). See also Michael Pugh ed. *Maritime Security and Peacekeeping: A Framework for United Nations Operations*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994.

humanitarian or environmental challenge at hand. A certain amount of multinational contingency planning can be done for particular waters and this will usually be carried out by littoral and user states. NATO does some contingency planning for example in providing a manual for Allied search and rescue procedures. It is not clear that there would be an additional contingency planning role for the WEU. However, a European led humanitarian operation is a distinct possibility in which case execution planning may fall to designated WEU commands.

Aside from constabulary and benign tasks there is much scope for co-ordination of other peacetime business, in particular: **exercising** where there is usually mutual benefit in operating together and sharing facilities; in the range of tasks classified as **presence** (Task CM1.1 defined earlier); and in **surveillance** (Task CM2).

At their meeting in Rome in 1992 the Heads of European Navies⁵⁰ commissioned twice yearly meetings of member nation's operational staffs at which fleet schedules are compared and opportunities for co-operation identified. Co-operation arranged in this way is of course driven by opportunity rather than policy and depends on the congruence of schedules.

As for the integration of maritime forces for specific operations, the WEU had an important enabling function in the latter stages of the Iran-Iraq War when concerted operations were carried out. This function was enhanced during the 1990-91 Iraq-Kuwait War. The WEU monitoring operation in the Adriatic, SHARP VIGILANCE, actually predated the equivalent NATO operation MARITIME MONITOR. The two operations continued in parallel through the transition from surveillance to sanctions enforcement (as Operations SHARP SWORD and MARITIME GUARD) until they were eventually combined as the fully integrated joint NATO and WEU operation SHARP GUARD. A separate WEU riverine operation to enforce sanctions has been conducted on the Danube. The present command arrangements for a WEU operation discussed below have, therefore, been proved for this scale of maritime operation.

⁵⁰The Heads of European Navies (HENS) meet annually under a rotational chairmanship. Membership is the professional heads of the naval services of the European nations in NATO. The forum is informal and has no NATO nor WEU status.

Within NATO operational planning and the control of operations is exercised through the commands and staffs that comprise the NATO command structure. For the WEU the Planning Cell is tasked with developing contingency plans but its capacity is tiny compared with that of NATO. It has no command function but has a responsibility to advise the WEU Council during the conduct of operations.

The WEU PC has recently completed work on an operational plan COMBINED ENDEAVOUR which provides a mechanism for the generation and deployment of WEU maritime contingency forces to accomplish tasks envisaged in the Petersberg Declaration. This plan provides for forces to be tailored for specific missions. In maintaining complementarity with NATO it does not create or invoke permanent command or force structures.

For the future the development of this element of maritime integration is closely associated with that of command and force structures⁵¹. While the WEU has no permanent command structure, contingency planning will remain the responsibility of the WEU PC. Under current WEU command arrangements operational execution planning for specific operations would be the responsibility of the staff of the designated national Joint Commander and Headquarters, augmented by representatives of other participating nations. Tactical execution planning would be the responsibility of the WEU force commander in theatre.

If the European aspects of the Combined Joint Task Force concept (discussed below under "Command Structures") are adopted in full as envisaged, problems of operational planning may be eased. The Concept is understood to envisage a joint NATO MNC/WEU planning staff that would conduct a certain level of contingency planning. In that event further contingency and execution planning resources of headquarters within NATO's command structure may be available for the planning of European operations.

As the WEU has as a matter of policy no standing or on-call forces, those forces made

⁵¹Indeed it is only because the WEU does not have command and force structures of its own that operational planning and execution appears as a discrete element in this paper.

available to the WEU Council would, under existing arrangements, be tailored for the needs of a specific situation. It is a relatively simple matter for maritime forces operating under standardized procedures to integrate on an ad hoc basis for peacetime and low intensity operations. However several of the possible maritime tasks (discussed in the section on "Maritime Tasks" above) might involve the very real risk of violence (for instance Tasks CM1.5, CM3, the CM5 series, PS1, PS4, C1 and C7). Once intense combat becomes a possibility, the operational integration of maritime forces faces similar problems to that of land-air forces in that they must be worked up⁵² to form integrated fighting formations under practised commands and staffs, and must have balanced capabilities for the tasks and risks at hand. NATO eases this problem by building the smaller maritime rapid reaction forces (NATO Task Groups) on a worked up core standing force (STANAVFORLANT or STANAVFORLANT) by adding the capabilities required by the specific mission. The largest reaction forces, NATO Task Forces and Expanded Task Forces, are likely to be built about a core of US national battle groups and battle forces respectively. Similarly the senior afloat NATO commands and staffs are likely to draw heavily on US national cores. For purely European operations neither of these options are available. Possible solutions to these problems are discussed under "Command" and "Force Structures" below.

Command Structures

NATO's IMS includes an elaborate permanent command structure of regional and functional commands at the summit of which is the North Atlantic Council. This structure was been modified to some extent after the end of the Cold War and is being reviewed again in the Long Term Study which is currently in progress (1995).

As a matter of policy the WEU does not have a permanent command structure. There are formalized ad hoc arrangements under which the on-scene WEU force commander reports to a member nations' Joint Headquarters and thence to the WEU Council. The WEU Council meeting in Lisbon in May 1995 decided to develop the role of the WEU PC in its support of the WEU Council during the planning and conduct of operations but the arrangements

⁵²Work up is a period of formal or informal training of groups of maritime forces (or individual units) in their operational roles and tasks under the supervision of an operational sea training authority or operational staff.

remain very modest when compared with the headquarters and staffs available to NATO.

The **Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)** concept accepted in outline by all NATO nations at the NATO Summit in January 1994 was conceived inter alia to provide a command structure for operations which might involve purely European forces. Development work on the CJTF Concept has yet to be completed and there is not yet (1995) agreement between nations as to the way ahead. If it is adopted as envisaged, it will greatly facilitate the generation and operation of European forces which might not only include those of the WEU but other EU members, where the mission is appropriate, and indeed partners from Central and Eastern Europe.

In essence the CJTF concept allows for mobile operational headquarters to be created from elements within existing NATO headquarters augmented by personnel from elsewhere. A CJTF commander could command forces as large as an army corps with naval battleforce and air equivalents for a major operation or much smaller forces tailored for more modest tasks. The headquarters could be ashore or afloat, or afloat subsequently moving ashore. The CJTF commander of a large force could report directly to a Major NATO Commander. Commanders of smaller forces could report to a Major Subordinate Commander.

It is not yet clear whether CJTFs will be an integral part of NATO's command structure⁵³ and usable for both non-Article V operations (for which there is an urgent need) and Article V operations for which the existing geographical command structure was designed. Nor has there been any public statement as to how and to what extent a European CJTF executing a WEU mission will meld with NATO structures while preserving the WEU Council's authority to give political direction in place of the North Atlantic Council.

Unless some arrangements can be made to allow Allied command to be fungible⁵⁴ between NATO and the WEU, there is a strong risk of duplication of structures. And duplication by the back door may already be upon us. EUROMARFOR will no doubt have a permanent

⁵³As the US who originally proposed the concept would wish.

⁵⁴A quaint expression but the only one that adequately describes the substitution of the WEU Council for the North Atlantic Council under certain circumstances.

command and staff as will EUROFOR on the model of EuroCorps. If a joint multinational staff were created to direct both formations, it would be a de facto permanent operational level European staff.

On the assumption that the CJTF Concept is adopted in full in its European manifestation, future command arrangements might be as follows:

- ***Strategic Level Functions*** The exact future shape of NATO's command structure will depend on the outcome of the Long Term Study. Hopefully this study will have addressed the issue of fungibility of command, as well as that of the possible expansion of NATO, in its attempt to prune and simplify the structure. A workable formal arrangement would allow for NATO's Military Committee (MC) to be accountable to the WEU Council for certain operations.

- ***Joint Operational Command*** A pragmatic future arrangement might allow an MNC⁵⁵ commanding a large European CJTF would report to the WEU Council through the MC. The other MNC might where appropriate have the role of a supporting commander. For a smaller operation a particular Major Subordinate Commander might provide the principal joint operational level headquarters and report to the WEU Council directly through the Military Committee with both MNCs acting as supporting commanders. In some cases a non-NATO joint operational level headquarters might be used (as under the current WEU command system) but would similarly report to the WEU through the Military Committee supported by the MNCs (when NATO resources are being used).

- ***In Theatre Command*** The mobile headquarters of a WEU CJTF would draw on staff and infrastructure from NATO headquarters as planned in the CJTF concept. National composition of staffs would reflect the national make up of the force.

- ***Maritime Component Commander*** There is military sense in maintaining permanent

⁵⁵The US nationality of both SACEUR and SACLANT might pose problems for this scheme. However, good use might be made of their European deputies. In appropriate circumstances France, or another nation might provide a temporary Deputy MNC.

commands and staffs at the tactical level, albeit as skeleton staffs. While WEU maritime forces are formed on an ad hoc basis, multinational staffs, especially those afloat, are unlikely to be practised until the formation has worked up. Indeed the work-up itself might be more protracted and less efficiently conducted than necessary under inexperienced international management. This is a problem also faced by NATO in the MNMF⁵⁶ concept although NATO has a number of predesignated afloat staffs who are established within the NATO command structure and who practise regularly⁵⁷. The problem is somewhat alleviated if core national formations are used under their own commands and staffs which can be augmented by participating nations. And this is indeed the tacit NATO solution. Similarly a standing or on call multinational formation such as EUROMARFOR could be used as a core with its permanent staff providing the necessary expertise from the outset. The problem would be further alleviated if augmenting staffs were drawn from a multinational European cadre who carried out this task regularly together and who were therefore used to working together in a variety of headquarters environments.

Force Structures

NATO's maritime force structures provide for fully integrated multinational maritime forces (MNMF) of various sizes and levels of capability and readiness. Only the Standing Naval Forces⁵⁸ remain as fully integrated formations during peacetime. The remainder are activated for exercises and specific operations.

There is a problem with any force structure that relies on standing or on call multinational components. Except in circumstances of major attack when nations will be bound by Article V/5 guarantees, it is possible, even probable, that some nations will decide not to commit

⁵⁶The Multinational NATO Maritime Force Concept (MNMF) is the term given to the maritime concept for creation of maritime multinational Reaction and Main Defence Forces.

⁵⁷For instance Commander Striking Fleet Atlantic (COMSTRIKFLTANT, who is also Commander US Second Fleet), his subordinate commander, Commander ASW Striking Force (COMASWSRIKFOR, who is also Commander UK Task Group) and Commander Striking Force South (COMSTRIKFORSOUTH, who is also Commander US Sixth Fleet).

⁵⁸The Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT), Standing Naval Force Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED), and Standing Naval Force Channel (STANAVFORCHAN) for which the new title of Standing Naval Mine Countermeasures Force (STANAVMINFOR) has been proposed.

forces to an operation. It is likely that future crisis management and peace support operations will be coalitions of the willing in which case essential elements and capabilities of a standing or on-call formation may not be available on the day.

As a matter of policy the WEU does not maintain its own force structures to parallel those of NATO. However, there are a number of purely European formations, that have been mentioned earlier, both within and outside NATO force structures that do not attract a WEU title but count as forces answerable to the WEU (FAWEU). The WEU PC maintains lists of these formations and national FAWEU. OPLAN COMBINED ENDEAVOUR provides a mechanism for the generation of WEU forces tailored for specific WEU operations from those specifically offered at the time by member nations.

The most efficient and reliable method of integrating forces is to build on existing national balanced tactical formations either by combining these into multinational operational formations or by augmenting a core national formation with elements of other nations' forces. Both methods exploit the inter-operability of national forces but preserve the political utility and force enhancements of multinational formations.

At present, it would be possible for the maritime forces of EU nations that are not members of NATO or the WEU to take part in low intensity, fully integrated WEU or NATO operations in which a high degree of inter-operability would not be essential. Where there is a risk of combat at high intensity, operations involving these units and WEU or NATO formations could be co-ordinated or concerted but not fully integrated unless inter-operability had been sufficiently developed through the adoption of NATO standards and long periods of integrated training.


A Force Framework. A possible solution to the European problem of ad hoc, and therefore poorly integrated and unbalanced, formations would be to devise a force framework that identifies national tactical force building blocks which could be aggregated and augmented notionally into larger multinational formations. This aggregation would be largely arranged on a geographical basis as navies whose bases are physically close have the greatest opportunities for frequent interaction and enhanced inter-operability. The framework would

not constitute a force structure as it could not be activated per se. It would not therefore threaten to duplicate NATO's force structure. For any particular operation tailored forces drawn from this framework would be used as volunteered by nations to create the principal surface elements of a European maritime force. This proposal would complement the CJTF concept in that the notional formations and staffs could be drawn on to form the Maritime Component of a European CJTF. The framework would serve the following purposes:

- Formalize the status quo in which a major WEU force is likely to be formed from existing national elements.
- Identify appropriate tactical and operational level national staffs which could be augmented to form afloat and in theatre WEU staffs.
- Indicate and formalize the requirement for specific nations to train and exercise closely together at the tactical and operational levels.
- Clearly identify key functional components of a force that must be included in a "coalition of the willing" for a specific operation, for example amphibious capability, organic air and command and control.
- Provide some framework for the building of forces and allocation and augmentation of staffs for WEU exercises.

Figure 7 illustrates a crude Force Framework of major surface combat units of the WEU nations bordering the Atlantic. The Mediterranean part of the framework could be similarly be devised using EUROMARFOR as one of the building blocks. Of course the designation "Atlantic" or "Mediterranean" does not in any sense restrict the area of operations of a force drawn from this part of the framework. It merely indicates the location of the providing nations. The framework as illustrated does not include logistic units, submarines, missile and patrol craft, mine countermeasures forces or land based maritime aircraft but could be extended to include these elements.

UNITS ←-----TACTICAL COMMANDS-----→ ←-----OPERATIONAL LEVEL COMMANDS-----→



*Possible national/bi-national commands that could provide European Maritime Component Commanders.

Figure 7: A European Atlantic Force Framework

Training and Exercising

Integrated training not only provides economies of scale but is also of fundamental importance in that it enhances inter-operability. Extensive integrated training of both units and formations is essential if multinational maritime forces are to be effective. Co-operation in European naval training used to be the purview of the Sea Sub-Group of EUROTRAIN. This group was not transferred to the WEU with the demise of the EUROGROUP but has been taken into NATO as the NATO Training Group. The Heads of European Navies have shown a particular interest in training and commissioned a compendium of national training facilities available to member nations. This publication has since been prepared and circulated by MOD Italy⁵⁹.

At present there is a significant amount of bilateral co-operation in training. Several NATO nations open their training facilities to other nations using various procedures for payment, including credit schemes under which training is provided in exchange for the use of training assets such as submarines and attack aircraft. Examples are the United Kingdom Operational Sea Training facility at Plymouth, the Joint Maritime Courses (JMC) run by the Joint Maritime Operational Training (JMOTS) staff at Turnhouse, Edinburgh, the French sea training facility at Toulon, and the Belgian mine warfare training facility (EGUERMIN).

The WEU Exercise Policy was agreed by WEU Chiefs of Defence in March 1994 and its continued development is a responsibility of the WEU PC. This Policy will govern the scheduling of WEU command post exercises (CPX) and live exercises and harmonization with the NATO Exercise Programme. WEU command and control arrangements were exercised during the UK Joint Command Planning Exercise PURPLE NOVA in November 1994 in which France, Portugal and the Netherlands participated and other WEU nations observed. This exercise had a substantial maritime dimension. A considerable amount of European maritime exercising takes place on a bi-, tri- and multilateral basis such as the French FARFADET, Italian ARDENTE, Spanish TARPON and United Kingdom JMC series.

⁵⁹European Maritime Cooperation: Ashore/At Sea Training Facilities Exchange List June 1993.

In a tightly controlled financial environment reductions in training and exercising threaten the operational performance of maritime forces. First, there are fewer units for operational tasking and there is less time available for training and exercising of those roles that are not related to the specific task at hand. Secondly nations may decide to make economies in the training facilities themselves. The extensive co-operation that already exists in training indicates that there may be economies in scale to be had by further co-operation and integration. Common training practices and standards also contribute substantially to interoperability.

European Training Centres. The development of some European training centres, at which high common standards can be developed and applied, may be one key to maximizing the operational performance of European maritime forces in a cost effective manner. For example the WEU could acknowledge in some formal way arrangements for the multinational use of the British, French and Belgian facilities mentioned above and these could be developed to provide proper international centres of excellence.

Gaming Gaming, or wargaming as it has traditionally been called, is a useful and economical contributor to the exercising of operational and tactical level commands and staffs. Higher level games conducted in a seminar format can be conducted using fairly modest facilities namely, an experienced moderating staff, some seminar and conference spaces with secretarial and information support. Lower level games may make use of extensive simulation and computer generated outcomes. Gaming allows for decision making to be exercised in a limitless range of scenarios that would be expensive to replicate in a live exercise. It allows commands and staffs to examine contingencies thoroughly without the constraint of artificially generated action that is a necessary part of cost-effective exercising using actual military units. Gaming can also produce insights that are useful to the development of strategic and operational concepts and plans. It may also be a tool of operational analysis and support force planning. Gaming can be carried out in operational headquarters although it is usually preferable to take players away from the distractions of their normal work. Some national gaming centres such as the United Kingdom's Maritime Tactical School⁶⁰ have

⁶⁰At HMS DRYAD, Southwick, Hampshire.

developed considerable expertise in gaming and the WEU would do well to make use of these facilities.

It is important that any schemes that serve to integrate specifically European exercising and training are not exclusive because any restriction in participation will reduce inter-operability particularly with North American forces. A smaller US Navy with global commitments will anyhow be able to spare fewer units to exercise in European waters and opportunities should not be squandered. Diversion of exercise resources to a WEU exercise programme could be at the expense of the NATO exercise programme which is already stretched by national economies and the need to include Co-operation and Partnership opportunities for forces from Central and Eastern Europe⁶¹. It is possible to be imaginative in the design of exercise scenarios in which a WEU force could subsequently combine with US forces as a notional WEU operation is adopted by NATO. Similarly US forces could co-ordinate operations with WEU forces in a WEU exercise scenario in which it is postulated that NATO has chosen not to act. Adoption of the CJTF concept would greatly expand the range of similar options and would ease the inclusion of Partnership forces.

For the same reasons European Training Centres should not exclude non-WEU participants. Geographical separation is an unfortunate regulator in itself. Also full use should be made of NATO training facilities (such as the FORACS ranges), and the very extensive North American facilities where these are offered and convenient to schedule.

Logistics

By the same token it would prejudice inter-operability within NATO if European logistic concepts were to be developed which deviated from those of NATO. In the past logistics have been largely a national responsibility within NATO. The same is true of necessity for ad hoc multinational operations outside NATO. This arrangement is unsatisfactory from a doctrinal point of view because apportionment and allocation of logistic resources is an important command function and the control of logistics should ideally be through the chain

⁶¹Scheduled through North Atlantic Co-operation Council and Partnership for Peace initiatives.

of operational command and control. In a multinational environment this ideal can never be fully realized because certain elements of logistics cannot be standardized. In any event production⁶² logistics will inevitably be only partly under military control. NATO has done much to standardize resources such as fuel and certain categories of munitions. And many other types of store need not be specific to nations. Afloat replenishment systems (for instance underway replenishment rigs) are standardized within NATO. Medical facilities may also be a common resource. Collaborative procurement may allow for greater standardization of equipment. Nevertheless it will not be possible in the foreseeable future to standardize the bulk of spare parts, many categories of munition, and specialist repair and maintenance facilities.

NATO has therefore adapted a doctrine of responsibility for logistics that is shared between the Alliance and individual nations. Allied maritime contingency planning includes the establishment of a Multinational Logistic Support Commander (MNLSC) responsible to the operational commander, Advanced Logistic Support Sites (ALSS) and Forward Logistic Sites (FLS)⁶³. These arrangements are mirrored in WEU maritime contingency planning (OPLAN COMBINED ENDEAVOUR).

It is sensible for a European maritime generic logistics concept to mirror this NATO concept exactly. Most European logistic contingency planning could draw heavily on NATO planning with the addition of specifically European details such as resource tables. For example most pre-identified ALSS and FLS adjacent to European waters could be common and similar arrangements for host nation support could be negotiated for both organizations. In any event the WEU may be heavily dependent on NATO (largely in the form of US assets) for some logistic capabilities such as heavy lift. Adoption of the CJTF concept in its full European manifestation would of course simplify common NATO/WEU logistic planning. If there are perceived to be European generic contingencies that would lie outside NATO planning, specific detailed European planning would be required⁶⁴.

⁶²The process of creation of logistic resources (eg manufacture).

⁶³See *The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine*, London: HMSO, 1995.

⁶⁴An example might be presence deployments (Task CM1.1) to the Far East in support of European trading interests.

The Western European Logistics Group replaced EUROLOG in December 1993 and is the appropriate forum for matters of European co-operation in operational logistics. It now reports to the WEU Council. A Maritime Sub-Group deals specifically with maritime issues. There are some logistic dimensions to CNAD and WEAG work.

DISCUSSION

In pursuit of the goal of maximum inter-operability amongst European forces it would be wrong to develop independent European agencies for standardization of equipment and procedures which would be at the expense of inter-operability with the US and other likely partners. Arrangements for common training and exercising should always be inclusive rather than exclusive. European logistic procedures should where possible be identical with those of NATO. Finally there should be transparency in operational and logistic planning avoiding duplication where possible.

It follows that the agencies of a common European defence could be very lean serving principally to work on the necessary differences between NATO and European functions making use to as large an extent possible such NATO products as are available. The WEU PC provides a model in that it is a relatively small staff that draws on existing NATO material in many of its functions.

Although the co-operation activity discussed above is extensive, it is spread across a number of very different agencies with representation drawn from national MOD staffs, national Fleet staffs, NATO staffs, national missions to NATO headquarters and the WEU PC. Accountability is similarly diverse and may be to the North Atlantic Council, Military Committee or to the WEU Council. The WEU PC is ostensibly the correct authority to co-ordinate European maritime co-operation activities - a function that it already partially fulfils by representation in many of the co-operation agencies discussed above. However it is a deliberately small group in which the modest maritime representation is spread between the sections. Top level military consultation over selected aspects of maritime co-operation is carried out by the Heads of European Navies but this is an informal group without a specific mandate beyond the requirements for efficient management of their individual services in the

international context⁶⁵.

Before the management a common European defence could be formalized, it would be essential for the structural relationship between the WEU (whether distinct from or part of the EU) and NATO to be developed. The perfect compromise (if compromise can ever be such) between Atlanticist and European Federalist extremes would be the fungible arrangement discussed above under "Command Structures" under which elements of NATO's IMS could be in whole or in part accountable to the WEU Council under certain mutually agreed circumstances. Proponents of the CJTF concept envisaged such an arrangement by which relevant parts NATO's command structure and infrastructure to be temporarily at the disposal of the WEU Council on occasions when NATO chose not to act.

Some agencies within NATO's International Military Staff, in particular the Military Agency for Standardization, could have dual accountability to the WEU Council to obviate the need for duplication. The WEU PC would only need to undertake procedural standardization were there were specific WEU requirements, for instance WEU procedures for requesting and approving ROE. The Defence Planning System could have dual accountability to the WEU Council with NATO having primacy as the organization involving the larger number of nations with the wider range of missions. European Force Harmonization Proposals could be considered alongside the MNC's Force Proposals in the process of deriving joint NATO/WEU Force Goals.

The measure of effectiveness of the Force Harmonization process would be that future European force tables developed from that in Figure 6 would provide adequate capability to achieve a detailed list of European maritime tasks similar to those listed in Figures 1 to 4. For this process to be effective, not only must Harmonization Proposals be accepted into Force Goals and approved by NATO and WEU Ministers, but nations must take heed of these Force Goals in their own force planning.

⁶⁵The HENS have recently formalized their procedures by setting up a pre-HENS Captain level meeting at which agenda issues are resolved, followed some months later by the plenary HENS Conference, which is followed in turn by the meeting of fleet scheduling staffs.

NATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS

It is not possible to speculate in detail on future national contributions to a common European defence as there is as yet no CDP nor military strategic guidance and only the broadest statement of WEU missions. Nevertheless, it takes time to change a maritime "order of battle" and one can draw the following modest conclusions from Figures 1 to 4 and 6 about the near future which will be the time frame in the minds of Ministers at the 1996 IGC:

- Only the United Kingdom and France possess a comprehensive range of maritime combat capabilities. Both nations have an expeditionary tradition coupled with fairly liberal legal constraints on the use of the military, and are practised in expeditionary operations. These nations, together with the Netherlands, could be said already to have role specialized in expeditionary combat. In the short term the EU/WEU would require the forces of either Britain or France or both to form the core of any European maritime force for operations in which there was a likelihood of large scale, high intensity combat. For operations of this type it is probable that operational level afloat commanders of maritime components of European joint task forces would be drawn from these nations. The previous French President has already staked a claim for France in this regard.
- Spain and Italy have the potential to develop a full expeditionary capability in the medium term and to field a core force and maritime command at the operational level for major combat operations.
- Spain, Italy, Germany and the Netherlands have the forces to provide the core and command for tactical scale maritime components of a European joint force.
- There is a sizeable diesel submarine force which is an important safeguard against major attack. However, all the nuclear submarines are British and French. These units can be principal tools for crisis management if they are given a land attack capability, such as the Tomahawk missile envisaged for United Kingdom submarines.

- There are considerable forces for humanitarian and constabulary operations and for modest crisis management and peace support tasks.
- Organic fixed wing combat aircraft would be few without the contribution of France.
- Although total numbers of amphibious troops are respectable (23,000), amphibious lift is inadequate.
- There would be a shortage of underway replenishment ships, for any operations requiring sustained reach particularly if the United Kingdom was not participating.

The shortages listed above should be viewed alongside Europe's well advertised inadequacy and dependence on the US for intelligence and surveillance and strategic lift.

CONCLUSIONS

The member governments of the European Union will follow up the initiation of a CFSP at Maastricht in 1991 at the 1996 European IGC at which progress towards a CDP, and perhaps a common defence, is likely to be discussed. Although there is as yet no European strategic concept, some institutional arrangements are already in place that could constitute elements of a common European defence. There also continues to be much piecemeal European force building with France as a common contributor to the various envisaged land, air and maritime formations.

If the debate on CDP and a common defence is to be properly informed, the high level political aspirations of enthusiasts for these developments must be related to military realities. The substance of any common defence must be European forces, with adequate operational effectiveness to achieve envisaged missions, directed through politico-military structures that permit timely actions and reactions. It may suit some governments to "play long" in this matter rather than risk the disengagement of the US from the security of Europe. Indeed the worst of worlds would have a Europe with as yet half-baked common defence arrangements abandoned by a US that feels badly snubbed, and all this in a rapidly worsening security

environment.

However there are some reasons for urgency particularly in the maritime dimension. Maritime forces have been co-ordinating operations from time to time under a WEU banner since 1987. One could not claim, however, that these have been great success stories for European integration. It is fortunate that the loose "concertation" that was achieved in the Gulf Wars was adequate to the very modest array of tasks. Similarly the fully integrated WEU frigate and destroyer force in the Adriatic has only been required to carry out a constabulary function. Maritime force has been employed in these cases because it is easy to use in support of diplomacy. The choice has been made easier because WEU politico-military structures are lean and allow for early responses to a developing crisis. But effective crisis management will often in the future entail coercion with the risk of fast and furious combat.

Also ships are expensive and take years to plan and build. Europe needs to address the equipment realities of a major coercive maritime operation without the USN at its heart. Unless there is some European long term force planning framework, advantages of scale will not be exploited, European ship numbers will dwindle and essential areas of capability may be lost.

Force planning is but one element of a common defence. The others are equipment collaboration; the related issue of equipment and procedural inter-operability; co-ordination and integration of operational planning and execution; command structures; force structures; training and exercising; and logistics.

European strategic guidance would be needed to govern the development of these elements. There can of course be no European military strategic concept without a CDP. However, it is possible to derive some illustrative military tasks from the Petersberg declaration headings of crisis management, peace support and humanitarian operations. One can also speculate about future common constabulary tasks in the longer term. It must be acknowledged that effective crisis management is predicated on the perception in the minds of antagonists of the ability and will to proceed to combat if suasive efforts fail.

European maritime forces must therefore be capable of high intensity combat in pursuit of power projection and sea control objectives. The WEU does not duplicate NATO in providing the functions of force planning and force structuring that are necessary to deploying this capability on the day. Even with the development of European multinational formations such as EUROMARFOR, WEU force structuring is intended to be largely ad hoc - indeed any coalition of the willing will to some extent be ad hoc in content.

There is therefore a need to address two problems. There is the force planning problem of providing for an order of battle that does not include the combat and command and control capabilities of the large and dominant USN. This could be resolved by creating a formal WEU/European component to the NATO Defence Planning System with an equivalent function to the NATO MNCs but tasked with providing Force Harmonization Proposals. The WEU PC would need either permanent or co-opted sea, land and air planning staffs for this function, working in the medium term within planning guidance provided by a strengthened EUROLONGTERM.

There is also the force structuring problem of providing for forces on the day that have the required balance of capabilities. It must be accepted as NATO has done implicitly that the most effective way of building a robust fighting maritime formation is to add multinational units to a national core formation and similarly to augment a national afloat command and staff to provide effective control. Some purely multinational formations might be created but they will need to spend much time in company if they are to be combat effective. A European Force Framework could provide the means of building effective formations from national cores.

To be effective, European maritime forces must also train and exercise regularly together. The Force Framework could be structured geographically thereby encouraging the closest integration of the maritime forces of geographical neighbours who would have the greatest opportunity to train and exercise regularly together. There is already a great deal of European training generally provided by host nations' training facilities. Some of these facilities could be developed into European Training Centres.

If the European aspects of the CJTF Concept are adopted in full as envisaged by its original proponents, problems of maritime command and control, and operational and logistic planning and execution, would largely be solved. The WEU would be able to use the relevant components and products of NATO's IMS. Specific European contingency planning work and development of procedures would be required only to supplement NATO products where European requirements extended beyond provisions made within NATO.

In summary, this paper recommends an evolutionary approach to European maritime integration and by implication a similar approach in the land/air dimension. Developments would capitalize on existing NATO and WEU arrangements rather than seek to duplicate or replace. Evolution does not, however, imply delay. Much of the maritime structure of a common defence is already in place. With the political capstone of a CDP, it would take no more than a general signal to create a European fleet from present day forces. With the implementation of a few specific organizational proposals this fleet could develop into a robust and flexible instrument of European policy, and be sustained as such in the future.

Specific Recommendations

There are several WEU maritime initiatives that might be taken forward to enable greater integration in any future common defence. These are:

- Establishment of a maritime Force Harmonization agency to assist the WEU PC to prepare maritime Force Harmonization Proposals for input into NATO's Defence Planning System. This group could be either standing or co-opted from national headquarters staffs when required.
- Expansion of the role of EUROLONGTERM, and its Sea Sub-Group in particular, in the derivation of new tasks, sponsorship of studies and operational analysis, and development of long term force requirements,
- Construction of a European Maritime Force Framework out of FAWEU from which tailored forces and experienced commands and staffs could be drawn for operations

and exercises.

- Establishment of a permanently constituted European maritime operational staff cadre to provide multinational augmentation of national afloat commands serving as Maritime Component Commanders.
- Establishment of European Sea Training Centres from some existing national facilities.
- Use by the WEU of national gaming (wargaming) facilities.

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